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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 07-3862
                    





     Kevin Bandy,
                                      Appellant
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. No. 92-cr-00448-1)
District Judge:  The Honorable Marvin Katz
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 5, 2008
                    
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: May 22, 2008)
                    
OPINION
                    
BARRY, Circuit Judge
2Appellant Kevin Bandy appeals from a sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment
imposed on him for violating the terms of his supervised release.  We will affirm.
I.  
Bandy pled guilty in 1992 to one count of interference with commerce by robbery
and one count of interstate transportation of stolen property.  He was sentenced to seventy
months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release.  After his
release from prison, Bandy violated the terms of his supervised release.  On October 19,
2000, the District Court held a violation hearing and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3),
revoked Bandy’s supervised release and ordered him to serve a term of imprisonment of
twelve months, which was to be followed by two years’ supervised release.  
On February 27, 2007, Bandy was again released from prison and commenced his
two years of supervised release.  He did not, however, as required by the terms of his
release, report to his probation officer within seventy-two hours.  Furthermore, on May
21, 2007, he was arrested for larceny, and pled guilty on August 15, 2007.  A violation
hearing was held on September 25, 2007.  The District Court determined that Bandy’s
failure to timely report to his probation officer constituted a grade C violation of the terms
and conditions of his supervised release, see U.S.S.G. 7B1.1(a)(3), and that his August
15, 2007 guilty plea constituted a grade B violation, see U.S.S.G. 7B1.1(a)(2).  The Court
revoked his term of supervised release and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of
twenty-one months.  
Two days later, on September 27, 2007, the parties filed a joint motion to correct
     1  That rule states that “[w]ithin 7 days after sentencing, the court may correct a
sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”  Fed. R. Crim.
Proc. 35(a).  
     2  We note, without reaching the issue ourselves, that the District Court cited the
following cases in support of its conclusion:  United States v. Tapia-Escalera, 356 F.3d
181, 187-88 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Jackson, 329 F.3d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Merced, 263 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Brings Plenty,
188 F.3d 1051, 1053 (8th Cir. 1999); and United States v. Beals, 87 F.3d 854, 858 (7th
Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Withers, 128 F.3d 1167, 1172
(7th Cir. 1997).  
3
the sentence for clear error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a).1  They
claimed that because the offenses of which Bandy was originally convicted were class C
felonies, see 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3), he could serve no more than two years’
imprisonment for violating a term of his supervised release, id. § 3583(e)(3).  Because he
had served twelve months’ imprisonment after the revocation of his first term of
supervised release, the parties believed he could only serve another twelve months
imprisonment.  Implicit in their argument was the idea that the maximum two-year
imprisonment for violations of one’s supervised release was cumulative, that is, it did not
apply to each violation but instead applied to the aggregated violations.  
The District Court agreed, holding that while we had not yet spoken on the issue,
every other circuit court that had found that the two-year maximum applies on a
cumulative basis2—viz., Bandy could serve no more than a total of two years’
imprisonment for any number of revocations that resulted in imprisonment. 
Consequently, the District Court reduced Bandy’s term of imprisonment to twelve
months.  
     3  Bandy argues, and only in his reply brief, that no waiver was effectuated because the
record does not show that he, as opposed to his counsel, knew that the Court was asked to
correct the sentence to twelve months imprisonment without a request that he be present. 
Consequently, the argument goes, his letter to the Court, sent three weeks after his
sentence had been reduced, served as a timely assertion of his purported Rule 43 right. 
We disagree.  See Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1398.  
4
II.  
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(b)(4) provides that a defendant need not be
present in the event of a correction or reduction of his or her sentence under Rule 35. 
Bandy argues, however, that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005), impliedly rendered Rule 43(b)(4) unconstitutional such that a
sentence correction under Rule 35(a)—where a correction is made due to “arithmetical,
technical, or other clear error”—requires the defendant to be present.  This is so, he
argues, because a sentence correction is now more akin to a “complete sentencing on
remand” (Appellant’s Br. 11), an event at which a defendant’s presence is required.  See
Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 43(a).  
We need not decide whether there is any merit to Bandy’s argument because he
waived any purported Rule 43 right to be present when he failed to assert this right at the
time the joint motion was filed.3  United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1398 (3d Cir.
1994) (“The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert
a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant’s right to be
present under Rule 43.”); cf. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 529 (1985) (per
curiam) (“[F]ailure by a criminal defendant to invoke his right to be present under Federal
5Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 at a conference which he knows is taking place between
the judge and a juror in chambers constitutes a valid waiver of that right.”).  Indeed, it is
fair to assume that there was no request to be present because the Government had
already agreed to reduce the sentence to twelve months and because the Court’s act of
correcting the sentence was a plainly ministerial function that did not require either
party’s presence.  
Bandy also argues that the sentence imposed was procedurally and substantively
unreasonable, even though, as the Government points out, he got precisely what he asked
for—a twelve-month sentence.  Bandy waived his right to challenge his sentence on these
alternative grounds; indeed, by asking for a twelve month sentence, he effectively
conceded that that sentence was entirely reasonable.  
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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